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Abstract
Given a stream S = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ), a φ-heavy hitter is an item si that occurs at least φN
times in S. The problem of finding heavy-hitters has been extensively studied in the database
literature. In this paper, we study a related problem. We say that there is a φ-event at time t
if st occurs exactly dφNe times in (s1, s2, . . . , st). Thus, for each φ-heavy hitter there is a single
φ-event, which occurs when its count reaches the reporting threshold T = dφNe. We define
the online event-detection problem (oedp) as: given φ and a stream S, report all φ-events
as soon as they occur.
Many real-world monitoring systems demand event detection where all events must be re-
ported (no false negatives), in a timely manner, with no non-events reported (no false positives),
and a low reporting threshold. As a result, the oedp requires a large amount of space (Ω(N)
words) and is not solvable in the streaming model or via standard sampling-based approaches.
Since oedp requires large space, we focus on cache-efficient algorithms in the external-
memory model.
We provide algorithms for the oedp that are within a log factor of optimal. Our algorithms
are tunable: their parameters can be set to allow for bounded false-positives and a bounded
delay in reporting. None of our relaxations allow false negatives since reporting all events is a
strict requirement for our applications. Finally, we show improved results when the count of
items in the input stream follows a power-law distribution.
1 Introduction
Real-time monitoring of high-rate data streams, with the goal of detecting and preventing malicious
events, is a critical component of defense systems for cybersecurity [47, 39, 50] and physical systems,
such as water or power distribution [15, 36, 40]. In such a monitoring system, changes of state are
inferred from the stream elements. Each detected/reported event triggers an intervention. Analysts
use more specialized tools to gauge the actual threat level. Newer systems are even beginning to take
defensive actions, such as blocking a remote host, automatically based on detected events [43, 34].
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When used in an automated system, accuracy (i.e., few false-positives and no false-negatives) and
timeliness of event detection are essential.
Motivated by these applications, we define and study the online event-detection problem
(oedp). Roughly speaking, the oedp seeks to report all anomalous events (events that cross a
predetermined safety threshold) as soon as they occur in the input stream. The related problem
of finding the most frequent elements or heavy hitters in streams has been extensively studied in
the database literature [29, 30, 4, 24, 19, 18, 38, 16, 32, 42, 17, 31, 17, 14]. More formally, given a
stream S = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ), a φ-heavy hitter is an element s that occurs at least φN times in S.
Here we focus on the problem of finding φ-events, where we say that there is a φ-event at time
step t if st occurs exactly dφNe times in (s1, s2, . . . , st). Thus for each φ-heavy hitter there is a
single φ-event which occurs when its count reaches the reporting threshold T = dφNe.
Formally, we define the online event-detection problem (oedp) as: given stream S =
(s1, s2, . . . , sN ), for each i ∈ [1, N ], report if there is a φ-event at time i before seeing si+1. A
solution to the online event-detection problem must report
(a) all events1 (no False Negatives)
(b) with no non-events and no duplicates (no False Positives)
(c) as soon as an element crosses the threshold (Online).
Furthermore, an online event detector must scale to
(d) small reporting thresholds T and large N , i.e., very small φ (Scalable).
In this paper, we present algorithms for the oedp. We also give solutions which relax condi-
tions (b) and (c). However, our solutions are motivated by cybersecurity applications where (a) and
(d) are strict requirements. Next, we discuss how each of these conditions relate to our approach
and results. See Section 6 for more details about the application that motivates the oedp and its
constraints.
No false negatives. We are motivated by monitoring systems for national security [1, 5]. The
events in this context have especially high consequences so it is worth investing extra resources to
detect them. We therefore do not allow false negatives (i.e., condition (a) is strict); see Section 6
for more details. This rules out sampling-based approaches for the oedp, which necessarily incur
false negatives.
Scalability. Scalability (condition (d)) is essential in the broader context of detecting anomalies in
network streams, since anomalies are often small-sized events that develop slowly, appearing normal
in the midst of large amounts of legitimate traffic [41, 49]. As an example of the demands placed on
event detection systems, the US Department of Defense (DoD) and Sandia National Laboratories
developed the Firehose streaming benchmark suite [1, 5] to measure the performance of oedp
algorithms. In the FireHose benchmark, the reporting threshold is preset to the representative
value of T = 24, which translates to φ = 24/N = o(1) and thus a DoD benchmark enforces
condition (d).
Scalable solutions to the oedp require a large amount of space, ruling out the streaming
model [6, 51], where the available memory is small—usually just polylog(N). In particular, stream-
ing algorithms for the heavy-hitters problem assume φ > 1/polylog(N) (all candidates must fit in
memory). Even if some false positives are allowed, as in the (ε, φ)-heavy hitters problem2, Bhat-
tacharyya et al. [16] proved a lower bound of (1/ε) log(1/φ) + (1/φ) log |U| + log logN bits. Thus
the space requirement is large when ε is small, as is the case for Scalable solutions where φ is
small, since ε < φ.
1We drop the φ when it is understood.
2Given a stream of size N and 1/N ≤ ε < φ ≤ 1, report every item that occurs ≥ φN times and no item that
occurs ≤ (φ− ε) times. It is optional whether to report items with counts between (φ− ε)N and φN .
2
Bounded false positives. Our algorithms for the oedp are tunable: parameters can be set to
allow bounded false positives (relaxing condition (b)). We show that allowing some false positives
results in fewer I/Os per element.
Allowing False Positives does not lead to substantial space savings. If we allow O(1+βt) false
positives in a stream with t true positives, for any constant β, a bound of Ω(N logN) bits follows via
a standard communication-complexity reduction from the probabilistic indexing problem [48, 37].
Besides, as argued above, Scalable solutions to the heavy-hitter problem require large space even
when False Positives are allowed.
Bounded reporting delay. The national-security monitoring systems we are interested in
(see Section 6) can tolerate a slight delay in reporting when the high-risk event gives sufficient
warning for intervention. We show that allowing a bounded delay in reporting (relaxing condition
(c)) allows us to circumvent the lower bounds on φ imposed by our online solution. Thus, bounded
delay is especially desirable when we want our oedp algorithm to scale to arbitrarily small reporting
thresholds.
Finally, we note that in a security setting like ours, all events need to be detected in real-time to
mitigate the associated risk. Thus streaming algorithms for the heavy-hitter problem that require
multiple passes over the data are not applicable.
Online Event Detection in External Memory
In this paper, we make the large space requirement (Ω(N) words) of the oedp more palatable
by shifting most of the storage from expensive RAM to lower-cost external storage, such as SSDs
or hard drives. In particular, we give cache-efficient algorithms for the oedp in the external-
memory model. In the external-memory model, RAM has size M , storage has unbounded size,
and any I/O access to external memory transfers blocks of size B. Typically, blocks are large, i.e.,
B > logN [33, 3].
At first, it may appear trivial to detect heavy hitters using external memory: we can store the
entire stream, so what is there to solve? And this would be true in an offline setting. We could
find all events by logging the stream to disk and then sorting it.
The technical challenge to online event detection in external memory is that searches are slow.
A straw-man solution is to maintain an external-memory dictionary to keep track of the count
of every item, and to query the dictionary after each stream item arrives. But this approach is
bottlenecked on dictionary searches. In a comparison-based dictionary, queries take Ω(logB N)
I/Os, and there are many data structures that match this bound [26, 7, 22, 9]. This yields an I/O
complexity of O(N logB N). Even if we use external-memory hashing, queries still take Ω(1) I/Os,
which still gives a complexity of Ω(N) I/Os [35, 27]. Both these solutions are bottlenecked on the
latency of storage, which is far too slow for stream processing.
Data ingestion is not the bottleneck in external memory. Optimal external-memory dictionaries
(including write-optimized dictionaries such as Bε-trees [22, 11], COLAs [10], xDicts [21], buffered
repository trees [23], write-optimized skip lists [13], log structured merge trees [46], and optimal
external-memory hash tables [35, 27]) can perform inserts and deletes extremely quickly. The fastest
can index using O
(
1
B log
N
M
)
I/Os per stream element, which is far less than one I/O per item. In
practice, this means that even a system with just a single disk can ingest hundreds of thousands
of items per second. For example, at SuperComputing 2017, a single computer was easily able to
maintain a Bε-tree [22] index of all connections on a 600 gigabit/sec network [8]. The system could
also efficiently answer offline queries. What the system could not do, however, was detect events
online.
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In this paper, we show how to achieve online (or nearly online) event detection for essentially the
same cost as simply inserting the data into a Bε-tree or other optimal external-memory dictionary.
Results
As our main result, we present an external-memory algorithm that solves the oedp, for φ that is
sufficiently large, at an amortized I/O cost that is substantially cheaper than performing one query
for each item in the stream.
Result 1. Given a stream S of size N and φ > 1/M + Ω(1/N), the online event-detection problem
can be solved at an amortized cost of O
((
1
B +
M
(φM−1)N
)
log NM
)
I/Os per stream item.
To put this in context, suppose that φ > 1/M and (φ > B/N or N > MB). Then the I/O
cost of solving the oedp is O
(
1
B log
(
N
M
))
, which is only a logarithmic factor larger than the na¨ıve
scanning lower bound. In this case, we eliminate the query bottleneck and match the data ingestion
rate of Bε-trees.
Our algorithm builds on the classic Misra-Gries algorithm [28, 44], and thus supports its gen-
eralizations. In particular, similar to the (ε, φ)-heavy hitters problem, our algorithm can also be
relaxed so that items with frequency between (φ − ε)N and φN may be reported. Allowing false
positives lowers the amortized I/O cost to O
((
1
B +
M
(φM−1)N
)
log 1εM
)
; see Theorem 1. For the
oedp (i.e., no False Positives), we set ε = 1/N .
Next, we show that, by allowing a bounded delay in reporting, we can extend this result to
arbitrarily small φ. Intuitively, we allow the reporting delay for an event st to be proportional to
the time it took for the element st to go from 1 to φN occurrences. More formally, for a φ-event
st, define the flow time of st to be Ft = t − t1, where t1 is the time step of st’s first occurrence.
We say that an event-detection algorithm has time stretch 1 +α if it reports each event st at or
before time t+ αFt = t1 + (1 + α)Ft.
Result 2. Given a stream S of size N and α > 0, the oedp can be solved for any φ ≥ 1 with time
stretch 1 + α at an amortized cost of O
(
α+1
α
logN/M
B
)
I/Os per stream item.
For constant α, this is asymptotically as fast as simply ingesting and indexing the data [22,
10, 23]. This algorithm can also be relaxed to allow false positives and achieve an improved I/O
complexity. Thus, this result yields an almost-online solution to the (ε, φ)-heavy hitters problem
for arbitrarily small ε and φ; see Theorem 2.
Finally, we consider input distributions where the count of items is drawn from a power-law
distribution. Berinde et al. [14] show that the Misra-Gries algorithm gives improved guarantees for
the heavy-hitter problem when the input follows a Zipfian distribution with exponent α > 1. If the
item counts in the stream follow a Zipfian distribution with exponent α if and only if they follow a
power-law distribution with exponent θ = 1+1/α [2].3 As our algorithms are based on Misra-Gries,
we automatically get the same improvements when the power-law exponent θ ≤ 2 (i.e., α > 1).
We design a data structure for the oedp problem that supports a smaller threshold φ than
in Result 1 and achieves a better I/O complexity when the count of items in the stream follow a
power-law distribution with exponent θ > 2 + 1/(log2(N/M)). For a representative specification
of 1TB hard drive and 32GB RAM, our algorithm is performant for Zipfian distributions with
α ≤ 0.94, a range that is frequently observed in practical data [25, 14, 45, 20, 2]. For instance, the
3Zipf and power-law are often used interchangeably in the literature, however, they are different ways to model
the same phenomenon; see [2] and Section 5 for details.
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number of connections to the internet backbone at the autonomous-system level follow a Zipfian
distribution with exponent α = 0.8 [2].
Result 3. Given a stream S of size N , where the count of items follows a power-law distribution
with exponent θ > 1, and φ = Ω(γ/N), where γ = 2(N/M)
1
θ−1 , the oedp can be solved at an
amortized I/O complexity O
((
1
B +
1
(φN−γ)θ−1
)
log NM
)
per stream item.
In contrast to the worst-case solution (Result 1), Result 3 allows thresholds φ smaller than 1/M
and an improved I/O complexity when the power-law exponent θ > 2 + 1/(log2(N/M)). (This is
because γ/N < 1/M in this case; see Section 5 for details.)
2 Preliminaries
This section reviews the Misra-Gries heavy-hitters algorithm [44], a building block of our algorithms
in Section 3 and Section 4.
The Misra-Gries frequency estimator. The Misra-Gries (MG) algorithm estimates the fre-
quency of items in a stream. Given an estimation error bound ε and a stream S of N items from a
universe U , the MG algorithm uses a single pass over S to construct a table C with at most d1/εe
entries. Each table entry is an item s ∈ U with a count, denoted C[s]. For each s ∈ U not in table
C, let C[s] = 0. Let fs be the number of occurrences of item s in stream S. The MG algorithm
guarantees that C[s] ≤ fs < C[s] + εN for all s ∈ U .
MG initializes C to an empty table and then processes the items in the stream one after another
as described below. For each si in S,
• If si ∈ C, increment counter C[si].
• If si 6∈ C and |C| < d1/εe, insert si into C and set C[si]← 1.
• If si /∈ C and |C| = d1/εe, then for each x ∈ C decrement C[x] and delete its entry if C[x]
becomes 0.
We now argue that C[s] ≤ fs < C[s] + εN . We have C[s] ≤ fs because C[s] is incremented only
for an occurrence of s in the stream. MG underestimates counts only through the decrements in
the third condition above. This step decrements d1/εe+ 1 counts at once: the item si that caused
the decrement, since it is never added to the table, and each item in the table. There can be at
most bN/d1/ε+1ec < εN executions of this decrement step in the algorithm. Thus, fs < C[s]+εN .
The (ε, φ)-heavy hitters problem. The MG algorithm can be used to solve the (ε, φ)-heavy
hitters problem , which requires us to report all items s with fs ≥ φN and not to report any item
s with fs ≤ (φ− ε)N . Items that occur strictly between (φ− ε)N and φN times in S are neither
required nor forbidden in the reported set.
To solve the problem, run the MG algorithm on the stream with error parameter ε. Then
iterate over the set C and report any item s with C[s] > (φ − ε)N . Correctness follows from 1) if
fs ≤ (φ− ε)N , then s will not be reported, since C[s] ≤ fs ≤ (φ− ε)N , and 2) if fs ≥ φN , then s
will be reported, since C[s] > fs − εN ≥ φN − εN .
Approximate online-event detection. Analogous to the (ε, φ)-heavy hitters problem, we define
the approximate oedp as:
• Report all φ-events st at time t,
• Do not report any item si with count at most (φ− ε)N
• Items with count greater than (φ− ε)N and less than φN are neither required nor forbidden
from being reported.
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All the errors with respect to oedp in the (ε, φ)-heavy hitters problem and the approximate
oedp are false positives, that is, non-events (items with frequency between (φ − ε)N and φN)
that get reported as φ-events. No false negatives are allowed as all φ-heavy hitters and φ-events
must be reported. In the rest of the paper, the term error only refers to false-positive errors.
Space usage of the MG algorithm. For a frequency estimation error of ε, Misra-Gries uses
O(d1/εe) words of storage, assuming each stream item and each count occupy O(1) words.
Bhattacharyya et al. [16] showed that, by using hashing, sampling, and allowing a small prob-
ability of error, Misra-Gries can be extended to solve the (ε, φ)-Heavy Hitters problem using 1/φ
slots that store counts and an additional (1/ε) log(1/φ)+log logN bits, which they show is optimal.
For the exact φ-hitters problem, that is, for ε = 1/N , the space requirement is large—N slots.
Even the optimal algorithm of Bhattacharyya uses Ω(N) bits of storage in this case, regardless of
φ.
3 External-Memory Misra-Gries and Online Event Detection
In this section, we design an efficient external-memory version of the core Misra-Gries frequency
estimator. This immediately gives an efficient external-memory algorithm for the (ε, φ)-heavy
hitters problem. We then extend our external-memory Misra-Gries algorithm to support I/O-
efficient immediate event reporting, e.g., for online event detection.
When ε = o(1/M), then simply running the standard Misra-Gries algorithm can result in a
cache miss for every stream element, incurring an amortized cost of Ω(1) I/Os per element. Our
construction reduces this to O( log(1/(εM))B ), which is o(1) when B = ω
(
log
(
1
εM
))
.
3.1 External-memory Misra-Gries
Our external-memory Misra-Gries data structure is a sequence of Misra-Gries tables, C0, . . . , CL−1,
where L = 1 + dlogr(1/(εM))e and r (> 1) is a parameter we set later. The size of the table Ci at
level i is riM , so the size of the last level is at least 1/ε.
Each level acts as a Misra-Gries data structure. Level 0 receives the input stream. Level i > 0
receives its input from level i − 1, the level above. Whenever the standard Misra-Gries algorithm
running on the table Ci at level i would decrement a item count, the new data structure decrements
that item’s count by one on level i and sends one instance of that item to the level below (i+ 1).
The external-memory MG algorithm processes the input stream by inserting each item in the
stream into C0. To insert an item x into level i, do the following:
• If x ∈ Ci, then increment Ci[x].
• If x /∈ Ci, and |Ci| ≤ riM − 1, then Ci[x]← 1.
• If x /∈ Ci and |Ci| = riM , then, for each x′ in Ci, decrement Ci[x′]; remove it from Ci if Ci[x′]
becomes 0. If i < L− 1, recursively insert x′ into Ci+1.
We call the process of decrementing the counts of all the items at level i and incrementing all
the corresponding item counts at level i+ 1 a flush .
Correctness. We first show that the external-memory MG algorithm still meets the guarantees
of the Misra-Gries frequency estimation algorithm. In fact, we show that every prefix of levels
C0, . . . , Cj is a Misra-Gries frequency estimator, with the accuracy of the frequency estimates in-
creasing with j.
Lemma 1. Let Ĉj [x] =
∑j
i=0 Ci[x] (where Ci[x] = 0 if x 6∈ Ci). Then, the following holds:
• Ĉj [x] ≤ fx < Ĉj [x] + (N/(rjM)), and,
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• ĈL−1[x] ≤ fx < ĈL−1[x] + εN .
Proof. Decrementing the count for an element x in level i < j and inserting it on the next level
does not change Ĉj [x]. This means that Ĉj [x] changes only when we insert an item x from the
input stream into C0 or when we decrement the count of an element in level j. Thus, as in the
original Misra-Gries algorithm, Cj [x] is only incremented when x occurs in the input stream, and
is decremented only when the counts for rjM other elements are also decremented. Following the
same arguments as the MG algorithm, this is sufficient to establish the first inequality. The second
inequality follows from the first, and the fact that rL−1M ≥ 1/ε.
Heavy hitters. Since our external-memory Misra-Gries data structure matches the original Misra-
Gries error bounds, it can be used to solve the (ε, φ)-heavy hitters problem when the regular Misra-
Gries algorithm requires more than M space. First, insert each element of the stream into the data
structure. Then, iterate over the sets Ci and report any element x with counter ĈL−1[x] > (φ−ε)N .
I/O complexity. We now analyze the I/O complexity of our external-memory Misra-Gries algo-
rithm. For concreteness, we assume each level is implemented as a B-tree, although the same basic
algorithm works with sorted arrays (included with fractional cascading from one level to the next,
similar to cache-oblivious lookahead arrays [10]) or hash tables with linear probing and a consistent
hash function across levels (similar to cascade filters [12]).
Lemma 2. For a given ε ≥ 1/N , the amortized I/O cost of insertion in the external-memory
Misra-Gries data structure is O( 1B log
1
εM ).
Proof. Recall that the process of decrementing the counts of all the items at level i and incrementing
all the corresponding item counts at level i+1 is a flush. A flush can be implemented by rebuilding
the B-trees at both levels, which can be done in O(ri+1M/B) I/Os.
Each flush from level i to level i+1 moves riM stream elements down one level, so the amortized
cost to move one stream element down one level is O( r
i+1M
B /(r
iM)) = O(r/B) I/Os.
Each stream element can be moved down at most L levels. Thus, the overall amortized I/O
cost of an insert is O(rL/B) = O((r/B) logr(1/(εM))), which is minimized at r = e.
When no false positives are allowed, that is, ε = 1/N , the I/O complexity of the external-
memory MG algorithm is O( 1B log
N
M ).
3.2 Online event-detection
We now extend our external-memory Misra-Gries data structure to solve the online event-detection
problem. In particular, we show that for a threshold φ that is sufficiently large, we can report
φ-events as soon as they occur.
A first attempt to add immediate reporting to our external-memory Misra-Gries algorithm is to
compute ĈL−1[si] for each stream event si and report si as soon as ĈL−1[si] > (φ− ε)N . However,
this requires querying Ci for i = 0, . . . , L−1 for every stream item and can cost up to O(log(1/εM))
I/Os per stream item.
We avoid these expensive queries by using the properties of the in-memory Misra-Gries frequency
estimator C0. If C0[si] ≤ (φ− 1/M)N , then we know that fsi ≤ φN and we therefore do not have
to report si, regardless of the count for si in the lower levels on disk of the external-memory data
structure.
Online event-detection in external memory. We modify our external-memory Misra-Gries
algorithm to support online event detection as follows. Whenever we increment C0[si] from a value
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that is at most (φ− 1/M)N to a value that is greater than (φ− 1/M)N , we compute ĈL−1[si] and
report si if ĈL−1[si] = d(φ− ε)Ne. For each entry C0[x], we store a bit indicating whether we have
performed a query for ĈL−1[x]. As in our basic external-memory Misra-Gries data structure, if the
count for an entry C0[x] becomes 0, we delete that entry. This means we might query for the same
item more than once if its in-memory count crosses the (φ − 1/M)N threshold, it gets removed
from C0, and then its count crosses the (φ− 1/M)N threshold again. As we will see below, this has
no affect on the overall I/O cost of the algorithm.4
In order to avoid reporting the same item more than once, we can store, with each entry in Ci,
a bit indicating whether that item has already been reported. Whenever we report a item x, we
set the bit in C0[x]. Whenever we flush a item from level i to level i + 1, we set the bit for that
item on level i + 1 if it is set on level i. When we delete the entry for a item that has the bit set
on level L− 1, we add an entry for that item on a new level CL. This new level contains only items
that have already been reported. When we are checking whether to report a item during a query,
we stop checking further and omit reporting as soon as we reach a level where the bit is set. None
of these changes affect the I/O complexity of the algorithm.
I/O complexity. We assume that computing ĈL−1[x] requires O(L) I/Os. This is true if the levels
of the data structure are implemented as sorted arrays with fractional cascading.
We first state the result for the approximate version of the online event-detection problem that
allows elements with frequency between (φ− ε)N and φN to be reported as false positives.
Then, we set ε = 1/N to get the result for the oedp.
Theorem 1. Given a stream S of size N and parameters ε and φ, where 1/N ≤ ε < φ < 1
and φ > 1/M + Ω(1/N), the approximate oedp can be solved at an amortized I/O complexity
O
((
1
B +
M
(φM−1)N
)
log 1εM
)
per stream item.
Proof. Correctness follows from the arguments above. We need only analyze the I/O costs. We
analyze the I/O costs of the insertions and the queries separately.
The amortized cost of performing insertions is O( 1B log
1
εM ).
To analyze the query costs, let ε0 = 1/M , i.e., the frequency-approximation error of the in-
memory level of our data structure.
Since we perform at most one query each time an item’s count in C0 goes from 0 to (φ−ε0)N , the
total number of queries is at most N/((φ−ε0)N) = 1/(φ−ε0) = M/(φM−1). Since each query costs
O(log(1/εM)) I/Os, the overall amortized I/O complexity of the queries is O
((
M
(φM−1)N
)
log 1εM
)
.
Exact reporting. If no false positives are allowed, we set ε = 1/N in Theorem 1. For error-free
reporting, we must store all the items, which increases the number of levels and thus the I/O cost.
In particular, we have the following result on oedp.
Corollary 1. Given a stream S of size N and φ > 1/M + Ω(1/N) the oedp can be solved at
amortized I/O complexity O
((
1
B +
M
(φM−1)N
)
log NM
)
per stream item.
Summary. The external-memory MG algorithm supports a throughput at least as fast as optimal
write-optimized dictionaries [22, 11, 10, 21, 23, 13], while estimating the counts as well as an
enormous RAM. It maintains count estimates at different granularities across the levels. Not all
4It is possible to prevent repeated queries for an item but we allow it as it does not hurt the asymptotic performance.
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estimates are actually needed for each structure, but given a small number of levels, we can refine
the count estimates by looking in only a few additional locations.
The external-memory MG algorithm helps us solve the oedp. The smallest MG sketch (which
fits in memory) is the most important estimator here, because it serves to sparsify queries to the rest
of the structure. When such a query gets triggered, we need the total counts from the remaining
log NM levels for the (exact) online event-detection problem but only log
1
εM levels when approximate
thresholds are permitted. In the next two sections, we exploit other advantages of this cascading
technique to support much lower φ without sacrificing I/O efficiency.
4 Event Detection With Time-Stretch
The external-memory Misra-Gries algorithm described in Section 3.2 reports events immediately,
albeit at a higher amortized I/O cost for each stream item. In this section, we show that, by
allowing a bounded delay in the reporting of events, we can perform event detection asymptotically
as cheaply as if we reported all events only at the end of the stream.
Time-stretch filter. We design a new data structure to guarantee time-stretch called the time-
stretch filter . Recall that, in order to guarantee a time-stretch of α, we must report an item x no
later than time t1 + (1 + α)Ft, where t1 is the time of the first occurrence of x, and Ft is the flow
time of x.
Similar to the external-memory MG structure, the time-stretch filter consists of L =
logr(1/(εM)) levels C0, . . . , CL−1. The ith level has size riM . Items are flushed from lower levels
to higher levels.
Unlike the data structure in Section 3.2 for the oedp, all events are detected during the flush
operations. Thus, we never need to perform point queries. This means that (1) we can use simple
sorted arrays to represent each level and, (2) we don’t need to maintain the invariant that level 0
is a Misra-Gries data structure on its own.
Layout and flushing schedule. We split the table at each level i into q = (α+ 1)/α equal-sized
bins bi1, . . . , b
i
q, each of size
α
α+1(r
iM). The capacity of a bin is defined by the sum of the counts
of the items in that bin, i.e., a bin at level i can become full because it contains αα+1(r
iM) items,
each with count 1, or 1 item with count αα+1(r
iM), or any other such combination.
We maintain a strict flushing schedule to obtain the time-stretch guarantee. The flushes are
performed at the granularity of bins (rather than entire levels). Each stream item is inserted into
b01. Whenever a bin b
i
1 becomes full (i.e., the sum of the counts of the items in the bin is equal to
its size), we shift all the bins on level i over by one (i.e., bin 1 becomes bin 2, bin 2 becomes bin 3,
etc), and we move all the items in biq into bin b
i+1
1 . Since the bins in level i+ 1 are r times larger
than the bins in level i, bin bi+11 becomes full after exactly r flushes from b
i
q. When this happens,
we perform a flush on level i + 1 and so on. Starting from the beginning, every ri−1M elements
from the stream causes a flush that involves level i.
Finally, during a flush involving levels 0, . . . , i, where i ≤ L − 1, we scan these levels and for
each item k in the input levels, we sum the counts of each instance of k. If the total count is greater
than (φ− ε)N , and (we have not reported it before) then we report5 k.
Correctness. We first prove correctness of the time-stretch filter.
Lemma 3. The time-stretch filter reports each φ-event st occurring at time t at or before t+ αFt,
where Ft is the flow-time of st.
5For each reported item, we set a flag that indicates it has been reported, to avoid duplicate reporting of events.
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Proof. In the time-stretch filter, each item inserted at level i waits in 1/α bins until it reaches the
last bin, that is, it waits at least ri/α flushes (from main memory) before it is moved down to level
i+ 1. This ensures that items that are placed on a deeper level have aged sufficiently that we can
afford to not see them again for a while.
Consider an item st with flow time Ft = t − t1, where t is a φ-event and t1 is the time step of
the first occurrence of st.
Let ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L} be the largest level containing an instance of st at time t, when st has its
φNth occurrence. The flushing schedule guarantees that the item st must have survived at least
r`−1/α flushes since it was first inserted in the data structure. Thus, r`−1M/α ≤ Ft.
Furthermore, level ` is involved in a flush again after t` = r
`−1M ≤ αFt time steps. At time
t` during the flush all counts of the item will be consolidated to a total count estimate of c˜. Note
that ` ≤ L and the count-estimate error of st can be at most εNt` , where Nt` is the number of the
stream items seen up till t`. Thus, we have that φNc˜+ εNt ≤ c˜+ εN . That is, c˜ ≥ (φ− ε)N , which
means that st gets reported during the flush at time t`, which is at most αFt time steps away from
t1.
I/O complexity. Next, we analyze the I/O complexity of the time-stretch filter. We treat each
level of the filter as a sorted array.
Theorem 2. Given a stream S of size N and parameters ε and φ, where 1/N ≤ ε < φ <
1, the approximate oedp can be solved with time-stretch 1 + α at an amortized I/O complexity
O(α+1α (
1
B log
1
εM )) per stream item.
Proof. A flush from level i to i + 1 costs O( r
i+1M
B ) I/Os, and moves
α
α+1r
iM stream items down
one level, so the amortized cost to move one stream item down one level is O( r
i+1M
B /
α
α+1r
iM) =
O(α+1α
r
B ) I/Os.
Each stream item can be moved down at most L levels, thus the overall amortized I/O cost of
an insert is O(α+1α
rL
B ) = O
(
α+1
α
r
B logr
1
εM
)
, which is minimized at r = e.
Exact reporting with time-stretch. Similar to Section 3.2, if we do not want any false positives
among the reported events, we set ε = 1/N . The cost of error-free reporting is that we have to
store all the items, which increases the number of levels and thus the I/O cost. In particular, we
have the following result on oedp.
Corollary 2. Given α > 0 and a stream S of size N , the oedp can be solved with time stretch
1 + α at an amortized cost of O
(
α+1
α
log(N/M)
B
)
I/Os per stream item.
Summary. By allowing a little delay, we can solve the timely event-detection problem at the same
asymptotic cost as simply indexing our data [22, 11, 10, 21, 23, 13].
Recall that in the online solution the increments and decrements of the MG algorithm deter-
mined the flushes from one level to the other. In contrast, these flushing decisions in the time-stretch
solution were based entirely on the age of the items. The MG style count estimates came essentially
for free from the size and cascading nature of the levels. Thus, we get different reporting guarantees
depending on whether we flush based on age or count.
Finally, our results on oedp and oedp with time stretch show that there is a spectrum between
completely online and completely offline, and it is tunable with little I/O cost.
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5 Power-Law Distributions
In this section, we present a data structure that solves the oedp on streams where the count of
items follow a power-law distribution. There is no assumption on the order of arrivals, which can be
adversarial. In contrast to worst-case count distributions, our data structure for power-law inputs
can support smaller reporting thresholds and achieve better I/O performance.
We note that previous work has analyzed the performance of Misra-Gries style algorithms on
similar input distributions. In particular, Berinde et al. [14] consider streams where the item counts
follow a Zipfian distribution, the assumptions of which are similar but distinct from power-law.
Next, we briefly review the distinction and relationship between Zipfian and power-law distri-
butions. This will allow us to compare Berinde et al.’s result to our work. For detailed review of
these distributions, see [45, 25, 20, 2].
Zipfian vs. power-law distributions. Let f1, . . . , fu be the ranked-frequency vector, that is,
f1 ≥ f2 ≥ . . . ≥ fu of u distinct items in a stream of size N , where u = |U|. The item counts in
the stream follow a Zipfian distribution with exponent α > 0 if frequency fi = Z · i−α, where
Z is the normalization constant. In contrast, the item counts in the stream follow a power-law
distribution with exponent θ > 1 if the probability that an item has count c is equal to Z · c−θ,
where Z is the normalization constant.
An stream follows a Zipfian distribution with exponent α if and only if it follows a power-law
distribution with exponent θ = 1 + 1/α; see [2] for details on this conversion.
Berinde et al. [14] show that if the item counts in the stream follow a Zipfian distribution with
α > 1, then the MG algorithm can solve the ε-approximate heavy hitter problem using only ε−1/α
words. Alternatively, on such Zipfian distributions, the MG algorithm achieves an improved error
bound εα using 1/ε words. Since all our algorithm so far use the MG algorithm as a building block,
we automatically achieve these improved bounds for Zipf exponents α > 1 (that is, power-law
exponents θ ≤ 2).
However, many common power-law distributions found in nature have 2 ≤ θ ≤ 3 [45].
In this section, we design a new external-memory data structure for the oedp with improved
guarantees when the power-law exponent θ ≥ 2 + 1/(log2N/M).
Preliminaries. We use the continuous power-law definition[45]: the count of an item with a
power-law distribution has a probability p(x) dx of taking a value in the interval from x to x+ dx,
where p(x) = Z · x−θ, where θ > 1 and Z is the normalization constant.
In general, the power-law distribution on x may hold above some minimum value cmin of x. For
simplicity, we let cmin = 1. The normalization constant Z is calculated as follows.
1 =
∫ ∞
1
p(x) dx = Z
∫ ∞
1
x−θ dx =
Z
θ − 1
[ −1
xθ−1
]∞
1
=
Z
θ − 1 .
Thus, Z = (θ − 1).6 We will use the cumulative distribution of a power law, that is,
Prob (x > c) =
∫ ∞
j=c
Prob (x = c) =
∫ ∞
j=c
(θ − 1)x−θdx
=
[− x−θ+1]∞
c
=
1
cθ−1
. (1)
6In principle, one could have power-law distributions with θ < 1, but these distributions cannot be normalized
and are not common [45].
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5.1 Power-law filter
First, we present the layout of our data structure, the power-law filter and then we present its
main algorithm, the shuffle merge, and finally we analyze its performance.
Layout. The power-law filter consists of a cascade of Misra-Gries tables, where M is the size of the
table in RAM and there are L = logr(2/εM) levels on disk, where the size of level i is 2/(r
L−iε).
Each level on disk has an explicit upper bound on the number of instances of an item that can be
stored on that level. This is different from the MG algorithm, where this upper bound is implicit:
based on the level’s size. In particular, each level i in the power-law filter has a level threshold
τi for 1 ≤ i ≤ L, (τ1 ≥ τ2 ≥ . . . ≥ τL), indicating that the maximum count on level i can be τi.
Threshold invariant. We maintain the invariant that at most τi instances of an item can be
stored on level i. Later, we show how to set τi’s based on the item-count distribution.
Shuffle merge. The external-memory MG data structure and time-stretch filter use two different
flushing strategies, and here we present a third for the power-law filter.
The level in RAM receives inputs from the stream one at a time. When attempting to insert
to a level i that is at capacity, instead of flushing items to the next level, we find the smallest level
j > i, which has enough empty space to hold all items from levels 0, 1, . . . , i. We aggregate the
count of each item k on levels 0, . . . , j, resulting in a consolidated count cjk. If c
j
k ≥ (φ − ε)N ,
we report k. Otherwise, we pack instances of k in a bottom-up fashion on levels j, . . . , 0, while
maintaining the threshold invariants. In particular, we place min{cjk, τj} instances of k on level j,
and min{cjk − (
∑j
`=y+1 τy), τy} instances of k on level y for 0 ≤ y ≤ j − 1.
Thus, the threshold invariant prevents us from flushing too many counts of an item downstream.
As a result, items get pinned , that is, they cannot be flushed out of a level. Specifically, we say
an item is pinned at level ` if its count exceeds
∑`+1
i=L τi.
Too many pinned items at a level can clog the data structure. In Lemma 4, we show that
if the item counts in the stream follow a power-law distribution with exponent θ, we can set the
thresholds based on θ in a way that no level has too many pinned items.
Online event detection. As soon as the count of an item k in RAM (level 0) reaches a threshold
of φN−2τ1, the data structure triggers a sweep of all the L levels, consolidating the count estimates
of k at all levels. If the consolidated count reaches (φ − ε)N , we report k; otherwise we update
the k’s consolidated count in RAM and “pin” k in RAM, that is, mark a bit to ensure k does
not participate in future shuffle merges. Reported items are remembered, so that each event gets
reported exactly once.
Setting thresholds. We now show how to set the level thresholds based on the power-law exponent
so that the data structure does not get “clogged” even though the high-frequency items are being
sent to higher levels of the data structure.
Lemma 4. Let the item counts in an stream S of size N be drawn from a power-law distribution
with exponent θ > 1. Let τi = r
1
θ−1 τi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1 and τL = (rεN)
1
θ−1 . Then the number of
keys pinned at any level i is at most half its size, i.e., 1/(rL−iε).
Proof. We prove by induction on the number of levels. We start at level L− 1. An item is placed
at level L − 1 if its count is greater than τL = (rεN)
1
θ−1 . By Equation (1), there can be at most
N/τ θ−1L = N/(rεN) = 1/rε such items which proves the base case.
Now suppose the lemma holds for level i + 1. We show that it holds for level i. An item gets
pinned at level i+ 1 if its count is greater than
∑i+2
`=L τ`.
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Using Equation (1) again, the expected number of such items is
≤ N
(
∑i+2
`=L τ`)
θ−1 <
N
τi+2θ−1
.
By the induction hypothesis, this is at most half the size of level i+ 1, that is,
N
τi+2θ−1
≤ 1
εrL−i−1
.
Using this, we prove that the expected number of items pinned at level i is at most 1/(rL−iε.
The expected number of pinned items at level i is
N
(
∑i+1
`=L τ`)
θ−1 <
N
(τi+1θ−1)
=
N
(r1/θ−1 · τi+1)θ−1
=
1
r
· N
(τi+2θ−1)
≤ 1
rεrL−i−1
=
1
rL−iε
.
5.2 Analysis
Next, we prove correctness of the power-law filter and analyze its I/O complexity.
We first establish notation. Let S be the stream of size N where the count of items follow
a power-law distribution with exponent θ > 1. For simplification we use γ = 2(N/M)
1
θ−1 in the
analysis.
Correctness. Next, we prove that the power-law filter reports all φ-events as soon as they occur.
In the approximate oedp, it may report false positives, that is, items with frequency between
(φ− ε)N and φN . As before, for error-free reporting we set ε = 1/N .
Lemma 5. The power-law filter solves the approximate oedp on S.
Proof. Let c˜i denote the count estimate of an item i in RAM in the power-law filter. Let fi be the
frequency of i in the stream. Since at most
∑1
`=L τ` < 2τ1 instances of a key can be stored on disk,
we have that: c˜i ≤ fi ≤ c˜i + 2τ1.
Suppose item st reaches the threshold φN at time t, then its count estimate st in RAM must
be at least c˜i ≥ φN −2τ1 = φN −2rL/θ−1(εN)1/θ−1 = φN −2(N/M)
1
θ−1 = φN −γ. This is exactly
when we trigger a sweep of the data structure consolidating the count of st across all L levels; if the
consolidated count reaches (φN − ε)N , we report it. This proves correctness as the consolidated
count can have an error of at most εN .
I/O complexity. We now analyze the I/O complexity of the power-law filter. Similar to Sec-
tion 3.2, we assume each level is implemented as a B-tree, although the same basic algorithm
works with sorted arrays (included with fractional cascading from one level to the next, similar to
cache-oblivious lookahead arrays [10]).
Theorem 3. Let S be a stream of size N where the count of items follow a power-law distribution
with exponent θ > 1. Let γ = 2
(
N
M
) 1
θ−1 . Given S, ε and φ, such that 1/N ≤ ε < φ and φ = Ω(γ/N),
the approximate oedp can be solved at an amortized I/O complexity O
((
1
B +
1
(φN−γ)θ−1
)
log 1εM
)
per stream item.
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Proof. The insertions cost O(rL/B) = O((1/r) logr(1/εM)) as we are always able to flush out a
constant fraction of a level during a shuffle merge using Lemma 4. This cost is minimized at r = e.
Since we perform at most one query each time an item’s count in RAM reaches (φN − γ).
The total number of items in the stream with count at least (φN − γ) is at most N/(φN − γ)θ−1.
Since each query costs O(log(1/εM)) I/Os, the overall amortized I/O complexity of the queries is
O
(
1
(φN−γ)θ−1 log
1
εM
)
.
Exact reporting. To forbid false positives, we set ε = 1/N and get the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let S be a stream of size N where the count of items follow a power-law distribution
with exponent θ > 1. Let γ = 2
(
N
M
) 1
θ−1 . Given φ = Ω(γ/N), the oedp can be solved at an
amortized I/O complexity O
((
1
B +
1
(φN−γ)θ−1
)
log NM
)
per stream item.
Remark on scalability. Notice that the power-filter on an stream with a power-law distribution
allows for strictly smaller thresholds φ compared to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 on worst-case-
distributions, when θ > 2 + 1/(log2(N/M)). Recall that we need φ ≥ Ω(1/M) for solving oedp
on worst-case streams. In contrast, in Theorem 3 and Corollary 3, we need φ ≥ Ω(γ/N). When
we have a power-law distribution with θ ≥ 2 + 1/(log2N), we have γN = 2M1/(θ−1)Nθ−2 < 1M for
θ ≥ 2 + 1/(log2(N/M)).
Remark on dynamic thresholds. Finally, we argue that level thresholds of the power-law filter
can be set dynamically when the power-law exponent θ is not known ahead of time.
Initially, each level on disk has a threshold 0 (i.e., ∀i ∈ 1, . . . , L τi = 0). During the first shuffle-
merge involving RAM and the first level on disk, we determine the minimum threshold for level 1
(τ1) required in-order to move at least half of the items from RAM to the first level on disk. When
multiple levels, 0, 1, . . . , i, are involved in a shuffle-merge, we use a bottom-up strategy to assign
thresholds. We determine the minimum threshold required for the bottom most level involved in
the shuffle-merge (τi) to flush at least half the items from the level just above it (τi−1). We then
apply the same strategy to increment thresholds for levels i− 1, . . . , 1.
This means that the τis for levels 1, . . . , L increase monotonically. Moreover, during shuffle-
merges, we increase thresholds of levels involved in the shuffle-merge from bottom-up and to the
minimum value so as to not clog the data structure, which means that the τis take their minimum
possible values. Thus, if the τi have a feasible setting, then this adaptive strategy will find it.
Summary. With a power law distribution, we can support a much lower threshold φ for the online
event-detection problem. In the external-member MG sketch from Section 3.1, the upper bounds
on the counts at each level are implicit. In this section, we can get better estimates by making
these bounds explicit. Moreover, the data structure can learn these bounds adaptively. Thus, the
data structure can automatically tailor itself to the power law exponent without needing to be told
the exponent explicitly.
6 Motivating National Security Application
In this section, we describe the more complex national-security setting that motivates our con-
straints. We describe Firehose [1, 5], a clean benchmark that captures the fundamental elements of
this setting. The oedp in this paper in turn distills the most difficult part of the Firehose bench-
mark. Therefore our solutions have direct line of sight to important national-security applications.
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Figure 1: The analysis pipeline that motivates our OEDP solution. Analysts associate a multi-piece
pattern, represented by the 4-piece puzzle, to a high-consequence event. The pieces arrive slowly
over time, mixed with innocent traffic in a high-throughput “firehose” stream. Our database stores
many partial matches to the pattern reporting all instances of the pattern. There still may be fair
number of matches, which are pared down by an automated system to a small number (essentially
droplets compared to the original stream) of matches worthy of human inspection.
We are motivated by monitoring systems for national security [1, 5], where experts associate
special patterns in a cyberstream to rare, high-consequence real-life events. These patterns are
formed by a small number of “puzzle pieces,” as shown in Figure 1. Each piece is associated with
a key such as an IP address or a hostname. The pieces arrive over time. When an entire puzzle
associated with a particular key is complete, this is an event, which should be reported as soon as
the final puzzle piece falls into place. In Figure 1, the first stage is like our oedp algorithm, except
that it must store puzzle pieces with each key rather than a count and the reporting trigger is a
complete puzzle, not a count threshold.
There can still be a fair number of matches to this special pattern, most of which are still not
the critically bad event. This might overwhelm a human analyst, who would then not use the
system. However, automated tools, shown in the second stage of Figure 1, can pare these down to
the few events worthy of analyst attention.
The first stage filter, like our oedp solution, must struggle to handle a massively large, fast
stream. It is reasonable to allow a few false positives in the first stage to improve its speed. The
second stage can screen out almost all of these false positives as long as the stream is significantly
reduced. The second stage is a slower, more careful tool which cannot keep up with the initial
stream. This second tool cannot, however, repair false negatives since anything the first filter
misses is gone forever. So the first tool cannot drop any matches to the pattern. Experts have gone
to great effort to find a pattern that is a good filter for the high-consequence events. We do not
allow false negatives because the high-consequence events that match this carefully crafted pattern
can and must be detected.
Each of these patterns are small with respect to the stream size, so the detection algorithm
must be scalable, that is, must be able to support a small φ. The consequences of missing an event
(false negative) are so severe that it is not reasonable to risk facing those consequences just to save
a little space. Thus we must save all partial patterns, motivating our use of external memory.
The DoD Firehose benchmark captures the essence of this setting [1]. In Firehose, the input
stream has (key,value) pairs. When a key is seen for the 24th time, the system must return a
function of the associated 24 values. The most difficult part of this is determining when the 24th
instance of a key arrives. Thus like Firehose, the oedp captures the essence of the motivating
application.
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7 Conclusion
Our results show that, by enlisting the power of external memory, we can solve online event detection
problems at a level of precision that is not possible in the streaming model, and with little or no
sacrifice in terms of the timeliness of reports.
Even though streaming algorithms, such as Misra-Gries, were developed for a space-constrained
setting, they are nonetheless useful in external memory, where storage is plentiful but I/Os are
expensive. Furthermore, using external memory for problems that have traditionally been analyzed
in the streaming setting enables solutions that can scale beyond the provable limits of fast RAM
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